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1. Introduction 
 
Japan experienced a major economic bubble in the latter 
half of the 1980s. There are two major indicators that tell 
the magnitude of the bubble. One is land and the other is 
stock. 
 
The Commercial Land Price Indicator, 100 in 1983, 
reached 336.8 in 1991. In eight years, on average, the land 
price had more than tripled. Stock prices also appreciated 
fast. The Nikkei Dow Jones Average, at the 10,000-yen 
level in 1984, reached 38,915 yen on the last trading day 
of 1989. This economic boom was unprecedented in 
Japanese history. The Japanese welcomed the arrival of 
the new decade, the 1990s, with great optimism and 
heightened anticipation for the continued economic 
expansion. 
 
Yet, the Tokyo stock market fell from the first trading day 
of 1990. This signaled the end of the grand economic 
bubble. The market kept going down and hit the bottom in 
October 1998 at 12,879 yen. This meant, in eight years, 
the Nikkei Dow Jones Average lost 67% of its market 
value. The market has recovered since then and is at the 
17,000-yen level today (July 2000), or 44% of its peak 
market value in 1989. 
 
After reaching their peak in 1991, land prices also started 
to decline. By 1999, the index was at 106.4. On average, 
those who invested in land in 1991 lost 70% of its value 
in nine years. In some areas, it is reported, land has lost 
90% of its peak values. Land prices are reported to be 
decreasing even today. Such was the magnitude of the 
economic fluctuation. 
 
The economic bubble is said to have started in 1985. Five 
years later, in 1990, it burst. Ten years have passed since 
then. Japan has not yet succeeded itself in getting out of 
this major recession. 
 
I wish to share my views with you as to why the bubble 
occurred and why the economic recession has lasted so 
long and what are the implications for management. 
 
In short, it appears that the bubble grew because of greed 
and the recovery is slow because of fear, and it is difficult 
for management to act against the prevalent social norms. 
 
 
2.   A Brief Discussion of the Past 
 
When Japan lost the war against the Allied Forces in 
August 1945, the country was in ruins. People were 
hungry, especially in the fall of 1945. For many Japanese, 
this hard life lasted for five years, until 1950. Many 
families survived hardship by exchanging their meager 
possessions, such as clothes, for food. Businesses were 
the same, using leftover materials to make household 
wares to satisfy people’s immediate needs. Yawata Steel 
Co., the largest steel manufacturer, made pots and pans 
with the leftover steel plates to feed their employees and 
Sony was peddling makeshift electric blankets. The 
country was in virtual bankruptcy. 
 
The invasion by North Korea of South Korea on June 25, 
1950, changed the Japanese economic picture overnight. 
The U.S. government decided to procure goods in Japan 
to engage its war efforts in Korea. There was a huge 
supply of well-educated and willing workers and idled 
production facilities to respond to the sudden and 
enormous American demand for business. During the 
following several years, the Japanese successfully rebuilt 
Japan from its wartime ruins. 
 
 
3.  Growth 
 
By 1960, Japan was ready to start its economic growth. 
Even at this point, the Japanese economic system was still 
based on a two-tier system. People in urban areas enjoyed 
industrial employment with higher wages and benefits. 
People in rural areas who engaged in farming, fishing, 
and forestry were working with traditional, labor-
intensive methods and earned marginal wages. As 
economic activities grew in the cities, villages supplied 
young, well-educated, hard-working workers. In this 
period, middle school and high school students were IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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recruited en masse by large companies. Upon graduation, 
they moved to cities in large numbers. 
 
In the 70s, many industrial companies were running out of 
their productive capacities. They found it necessary to 
build more production facilities. Yet, industrial sites in the 
cities were limited. These companies started securing 
large tracts of land in rural Japan and began building 
major factories. Farmland and forests were converted into 
industrial complexes. For the first time in Japanese 
history, the rural people began to amass wealth. They 
were able to mechanize their operations, improve their 
residential homes, and upgrade their living standards. 
Young people found many options to employment in their 
native areas. Wage differentials between rural and urban 
areas became less pronounced. 
 
 
4.  The Land 
 
As discussed before, when the World War II ended, there 
were major food shortages. In addition, people needed 
clothes and other necessities of life. Once these basic 
needs were satisfied, they started wanting more 
comfortable shelters. 
 
To build houses, land must be secured. As people became 
more affluent, the demand for land intensified and, by 
1960, land prices had begun to go up. In the 1970s, the 
rate of increases in land price intensified. For instance, in 
1974, the Government reported that land prices had 
increased 30.9% from the previous year. 
 
People who brought land were rewarded with significant 
price appreciation. This phenomenon lasted for 40 years, 
until 1991.  
The Japanese land mass is one twenty-fifth of that of 
America. Yet, its population as well as economic size is 
about one half of America’s. In April 1990, an interesting 
statistic was published in Japan. The total land value of 
Japan was estimated at $2,961 billion. The total land 
value of America was estimated at $2,839 billion. At the 
peak of the bubble, the aggregate value of the Japanese 
land was more expensive than that of America. 
 
A myth was born. The land price in Japan will only go up, 
because the land supply is so limited. Even though land 
prices may occasionally go down for a short time, they 
will always bounce back. It appears that many people, 
including politicians, government bureaucrats, business 
executives, and investors, believed in this MYTH. 
 
 
5.  The Dollar/Yen Exchange Rate 
 
After the World War II, the Dollar/Yen exchange rate was 
fixed at $1.00=360 yen. In 1972, however, the exchange 
rate moved from fixed to floating system. At first, the 
dollar value fell only a little at $1.00=330 yen. Then it 
moved toward $1.00=300 yen. By this time, Japan had 
established herself as a major industrial nation, exporting 
high quality industrial goods. To Japanese companies, a 
falling dollar value against the yen meant that their goods 
were becoming proportionately more expensive in the 
world market, forcing the Japanese companies to suffer a 
major competitive disadvantage. 
 
Nevertheless, by the 1980s people enjoyed economic 
affluence throughout Japan. Their basic needs were fully 
satisfied. They started seeking not just shelter, but 
comfortable and quality housing, leisure activities, and 
travel abroad. High quality condominiums, resort hotels, 
and country clubs became fashionable. 
 
By 1985, one dollar was worth 240 yen. The U.S. 
government felt even at this rate, the yen was still too 
cheap. A meeting of Finance Ministers of five 
economically advanced nations (G-5: U.S.A., France, 
England, Germany, and Japan) was held at the Plaza 
Hotel in New York, in September 1985. The Plaza 
Accord was concluded by these ministers, where the five 
nations agreed to cooperate to increase the value of yen 
against other currencies. This accord had a major impact 
on the Dollar/Yen exchange rate, as indicated by the 
following. 
 
July 1986: $1.00=150 yen 
Feb. 1987: $1.00=140 yen 
Apr. 1995: $1.00=80 yen 
July 2000: $1.00=106 yen 
 
 
6.  Expensive yen 
 
The rapid increases in the yen’s value relative to that of 
the dollar alarmed many Japanese business executives. 
What they were able to export at $1.00 in 1972 increased 
to $2.57 by 1987. There was a chorus of complaints from 
the business sectors and the government feared a major 
economic recession would occur, triggered by the high 
yen value. 
 
The Bank of Japan, fearing a major recession, lowered the  
interest rates five times in succession from 5% in 1985 to 
2.5% in 1987 in its hope to ease the impact of the yen’s 
high value. This move, however, created a situation where 
excessive capital became available to finance speculative 
land ventures. 
 
Meanwhile, demand for land was building up. The Bank 
of Japan made it easier for speculators to invest in land. 
Many people consider, in retrospect, that the Bank of 
Japan’s ill-timed interest rate reductions generated IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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excessive money supply that helped to cause the 
economic bubble of the 1980s. 
 
In retrospect, these interest rate reductions were not 
necessary for the following reasons: 
 
1.  Demand for Japanese Industrial Products: The 
reputation of Japanese products had been firmly 
established by this time and many of the 
products were being sold with added premiums. 
Measured price increases would not have made 
much dent in the demand for the products. 
 
2.  TQC Movement: W. Edward Deming was 
instrumental in introducing statistical quality 
control concepts and initiating the Quality 
Control Circle activities in Japan after the war. 
TQC, first advocated by A. V. Feigenbaum, was 
also introduced along with many other American 
management theories and practices. By 1985, the 
Japanese style TQC was firmly established in 
many of the Japanese companies, effectively 
lowering the production costs and helping the 
Japanese companies become ever more 
competitive in the world market. 
 
3.  Management and Worker Cooperation: The 
Plaza Accord and the rapid increase in the yen’s 
value against dollar created, for both Japanese 
management and workers, a sense of business 
crisis. Employees were willing to participate 
fully in TQC activities. Management and worker 
cooperation in TQC made Japanese companies 
successful in achieving increased product 
quality, lowered costs, dependable delivery, and 
customer-oriented services. 
 
4.  Lower Costs of Imported Goods: The increase in 
the yen’s value meant lowered costs of imported 
goods. Japan lacks natural resources. Energy and 
most raw materials for industrial activities are 
imported from overseas. When the yen 
appreciated 300% from the 1970s, it meant that 
raw material costs decreased by two thirds, all 
other things being equal. 
 
5.  Equity Financing: Banks used to finance large 
and well-established companies’ operations and 
business expansions. These companies were 
faithful and trustworthy borrowers of capital 
from banks. As internationalization of Japanese 
companies continued, large corporations started 
securing necessary capital through equity 
financing in the world market. In  1961, for 
instance, Sony floated its first ADR (American 
Depositary Receipt) in America. Sony found it 
less expensive to finance its business expansions 
through equity financing in the world market. 
Many other corporations followed suit. 
 
 
7. New Borrowers of Capital  
 
By 1985, the Japanese bankers lost major corporations as 
their main capital borrowers. At the same time, with the 
rapid lowering of  interest rates by the Bank of Japan, the 
supply of capital flooded the banks. They needed 
borrowers. Smaller companies, developers in housing, 
resorts, and recreational facilities, started expanding land-
related businesses. At first, they were enormously 
successful. Major banks started financing these 
developer-initiated projects on a massive scale. 
 
 
8.  The Economic Bubble  
 
Daring enterprises with creative ideas were able to amass 
fortunes with borrowed money. Bankers felt safe in 
lending money secured by land as collateral. As the value 
of land increased, the levels of mortgage limits increased 
also, making it possible for the entrepreneur to borrow 
more money from banks. Excessive supply of capital 
flowed to the stock market, also, causing the Nikkei Dow 
Jones Average to go up. 
 
For a few years in the second half of the 1980s, banks 
with so much excess capital to lend encouraged even 
private citizens to borrow money to invest. Homeowners 
were advised by bankers to raze their houses and build 
apartments or condominiums, thus creating a new means 
of asset building. Those who committed to this new mode 
of thinking did indeed move into a new, high quality 
residence, and made a fortune to boot. 
 
Many companies started to secure additional capital from 
the equity market, not to invest in their production 
facilities, but to speculate in the booming economy. 
Speculating in land, stocks, paintings, and other 
collectible objects often turned out to be more profitable 
than their main business ventures. Business executives 
who stayed away from land and stock speculation were 
often criticized by their employees and journalists as 
being too timid, ignoring the great opportunity for these 
companies to amass fortune on the side. Many executives 
were pressured to speculate in land, stocks, and other 
“asset building” activities.  
 
Through land and stock investment, it is reported that 
about fifteen trillion dollars of capital gain was made 
between 1986 and 1989. 
 
There were voices of caution from prominent and 
seasoned business executives against such speculation. 
For instance, Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Panasonic, admonished business executives to keep their 
focus on their businesses, not on land speculation. Masaru 
Amada, the founder of Amada Machinery, wrote a book 
titled, “The Victory of Corporate Management with Zero 
Debt,” warned of the danger of speculative ventures 
through debt financing. These warnings were largely 
unheeded, however. 
 
The general public started participating in the stock 
market also. Many IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) were 
bought up with enthusiasm. The most famous IPO was the 
case of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). In 1989, 
NTT decided to offer its stock to the public. It was 
originally considered that a fair market value of NTT 
would be 700,000 to 800,000 yen per share. Because of 
the over-heated market condition, it was decided to offer 
NTT stock at 1.19 million yen per share. The price of its 
initial trading in the market was 1.6 million yen per share. 
The stock price soon went up to 2.5 million yen per share.  
 
Land developers, successful with their initial projects, 
expanded their businesses recklessly. In 1985, there were 
1,400 country clubs in Japan. Ten years later, in 1995, 
there were 2,400 clubs. For a while, constructing a new 
country club by selling membership seats at inflated 
membership fees and security deposits was the proverbial 
golden goose for developers. By the late 1980s, people 
became used to the idea that “what is bought today will 
go up tomorrow.” An art dealer in Tokyo was said to have 
confided that he was able to make $3,000 to $4,000 by 
just buying a painting in a gallery in Tokyo and selling 
the same in another gallery on the same day. Everyone 
seemed to be looking for moneymaking opportunities. It 
was becoming more difficult, however, to find good 
opportunities to make quick gains in Japan. 
 
Near the end of the 1980s those developers who had been 
successful in speculative land developments in Japan, 
began their operations in other countries. They started 
buying landmark hotels, prestigious golf courses, and 
resort places in America, Hong Kong, Singapore, Saipan, 
and other places. They even bought the Rockefeller 
Center in New York. 
 
Until 1984, investment in properties in foreign lands was 
limited to three or four cases a year. In 1988, forty-eight 
major investment deals were concluded. The net value of 
land acquired by Japanese companies in 1984 was 415 
billion yen. It was over 13 trillion yen in 1990, or 31 
times of the 1984-level acquisition. By 1990, the 
aggregate land investment by Japanese companies 
reached 42 trillion yen. Obviously, most of the land was 
held for speculative purposes and was not employed for 
productive uses. 
 
Buyers expected that everything they bought would 
increase in value. They appeared to be greed-driven. 
Many major corporate executives, too, were so driven. 
They lost their sense of corporate missions and proper 
business conducts. The general public was greed driven, 
too. They speculated in land, stocks, gold, art, and other 
objects. It seemed that the entire country was engaged in 
speculative money making activities. 
 
 
9.  Reversal of Interest Rates 
 
By the late 1980s the Japanese government became 
alarmed by the rampant land speculation, resulting, in 
part, in the destruction of many healthy communities. The 
government passed a law severely limiting the bankers’ 
ability to finance land development. At the same time, the 
Bank of Japan raised the  interest rate six times, from 
2.5% in 1989 to 6% in 1990. 
 
Quickly funding sources dried up. From 1990 on, land 
and stock prices fell sharply. As observed earlier, by 1999 
the average land price was about one third of what it was 
in 1990. In certain places, land prices went down as much 
as 90%. The Nikkei Dow Jones Average recorded 12,879 
yen in October 1998, about one third of the 38,915-yen 
figure recorded on the last trading day of 1989. 
 
With the economic bubble thus ended, many companies 
went bankrupt and many investors lost their money. 
 
 
10.   The Economic Recession 
 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange’s Nikkei Dow Jones Average 
has recovered to the 17,000-yen level this year. Many 
companies have started hiring new workers from schools 
and business executives show a greater optimism for the 
future. The Japanese economy may be finally recovering. 
But we may have to wait and see. There are many reasons 
why it is taking so long for Japan to jump-start its 
economic growth. 
 
1.  Extensive Losses: Many companies that engaged 
in speculative investment in land, stocks, and 
other commodities incurred massive losses when 
the bubble burst. Banks that provided easy credit 
to questionable business projects ended up with 
billions of dollars of bad debt. 
 
2.  Expectations of Quick Economic Recovery and 
Delayed Fundamental Solutions to Problems: 
Many company executives who suffered losses 
thought that the Japanese economy would 
recover soon. If and when stocks and land prices 
went back up again, as they always had in the 
past, their problems would be resolved. Thus, 
they decided to wait for the economy to recover. 
Meanwhile, they used many complicated and IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
 5 
often dubious techniques to hide their losses and 
bad debts. 
 
Unfortunately, the economy did not recover quickly. 
During the past ten years, bad news has shocked the 
Japanese people over and over again. 
 
 
11.  Cold Reality 
 
Many companies that made investments in foreign 
countries, i.e. landmark buildings, resort places, golf 
courses, and others, at inflated prices, were forced to 
dispose them at a great loss. It was as if fools sucked up 
billions of hard-earned dollars from people and threw 
them away. 
 
One by one, top executives of many major corporations 
confessed in public of their dubious financial transactions 
and their consequences. Banks, trading companies, 
brokerage firms and other respectable business entities 
that appeared invincible died suddenly and disappeared. 
This was incredible. Workers who chose these prestigious 
institutions upon graduating from their colleges did so 
expecting lifetime employment. However, these 
companies faded away and workers found themselves 
unemployed. 
 
There was a myth in Japan that government would save 
failing financial institutions. Indeed, in the past, banks 
and brokerage houses in financial troubles were saved by 
the government. The financial institutions, in turn 
protected major corporations in financial difficulties. 
Corporations protected their employees even in economic 
downturns. 
 
This time, the government did not have the ability to 
rescue troubled financial institutions. Yamaichi, one of 
the big four stock brokerage houses, folded its business. 
So did many major banks. 
 
Suddenly, it became apparent to the business concerns 
that they were on their own. To survive in economic 
hardship, they needed to become mean and lean. 
Companies started restructuring and eliminating middle-
aged long-term employees. There was no more lifetime 
employment. 
 
 
12.   Long Lasting Economic Recession  
 
The Bank of Japan lowered the  interest rate seven times, 
from 6% in 1991 to 1.75% in 1993 to stimulate the 
economy. They were partially successful and the 
economy appeared to recover by 1997. However, that 
year, the government raised the sales tax from 3% to 5%. 
The general public was already fearful of unemployment 
and held the purse strings tightly. This ill-timed sales tax 
increase made consumers more defensive. For many 
decades, the Japanese people had enjoyed the economic 
affluence. Their possessions were overflowing in the 
household. Consumers, thus, stopped spending. 
 
In order to stimulate consumer spending, the government 
disbursed 20,000 yen (about $200) in coupon form to 
every senior citizen and minor. The only stipulation was 
to spend the coupon in local stores. This trial ended in 
failure. People used the coupon to buy necessities and 
saved their income for rainy days. Consumer spending is 
not increasing even today. 
 
 
13.  Lack of Trust 
 
Many corruptive, illegal, and self-serving relationships 
among high-ranking bureaucrats, politicians, and business 
executives have been reported by the news media. Trust 
by people in government officials, politicians, and 
corporate executives has gone down, alienating the 
general public from the people in traditionally respected 
offices. 
 
The Japanese people are finding it more difficult to trust 
even their own employers. Lack of trust breeds fear. Fear 
encourages conservation of personal resources. Lack of 
consumer spending is acting as a major deterrent to 
economic recovery. Each individual’s micro activity of 
not spending is causing the macro result of economic 
stagnation. 
 
 
14.  Conclusion 
 
I have examined a few aspects of the Japanese economy 
and offered a number of reasons for the occurrence of a 
major economic bubble. I also offered a few causes for 
the economy floundering in its trough. 
 
Now, what would be the implication of this recent 
economic bubble on management? The most important 
lesson appears to be that executives must not be overly 
influenced by pervasive economic optimism on the one 
hand, and gloom and doom on the other. They need to 
have their own guiding star, independent of the existing 
social norms and sentiments. Thus, they can steer their 
organizations more cautiously at times of pervasive 
optimism in a robust economy and make bold moves with 
new ventures when the norm is one of caution and 
inaction. 
 
It is the top executives’ prime responsibility to keep their 
companies steady in their pursuit of their corporations’ 
original objectives. The recent Japanese experience tells 
us that many top executives failed to do so. They were IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
 6 
blinded by greed at the height of the economic bubble and 
now they are frozen into inaction for fear of further 
failures. 
 
An executive’s true character, therefore, is tested at the 
time of major social and/or economic upheavals like 
Japan has experienced in recent years. 
 
Note:  This paper was initially prepared as a presentation 
note. It used information from Nikkei Business, Bungei 
Shunshu, various newspapers, reference books, and 
government publications. 
 
 
 
 